Pope, Papacy and Sede vacante, in a text by Saint Antoninus and in Father Guérard des Lauriers’ thought

by Fr. Francesco Ricossa

From Sodalitium, issue n. 67

As is well known, on the morning of February 11, 2013, Benedict XVI announced in the Consistory his “resignation from the ministry as Bishop of Rome, Successor of Saint Peter”, clarifying that the See would effectively be vacant beginning February 28 at 8:00 pm; on the following March 13, Jorge Mario Bergoglio was elected to replace Joseph Ratzinger, presenting himself to the world as the new “Bishop of Rome”. Our opinion – for what it’s worth – was expressed in two press releases, the first on February 11 in which we predicted that the night would get even darker, and then on March 15, in which we noted, with Bergoglio’s election, the realization of that not-so-difficult prediction. In this article, I do not intend to dwell particularly on the actions – I dare not say government – of Jorge Mario Bergoglio, which is there for all to see, but yet once again, what the Supreme Pontiff is to the Church, above all through the process by which a man, who was not born the successor of Peter and the Vicar of Christ, becomes so, or ceases to be so, or finds an obstacle from becoming so. In short, I will deal once again with the election of the Supreme Pontiff, a theme that our magazine has already addressed from other points of view in the past (1). Joseph Ratzinger’s resignation, in fact, can help us understand, by concrete example, how the man elected to the papacy is one thing, and the papacy itself is another, and how the accidental link between such a person and the papacy also depends upon (but not only) a human act, elicited by human will: indeed, if Benedict XVI was the Pope (2), he would have been so until 8:00 pm on February 28, 2013, and the next instant – by a single act of his will – he would totally cease to be so, bringing for his person an end to that special relationship with Christ in which, as we will see, the papacy formally consists.
​An interesting text by Saint Antoninus of Florence might help us, a tract from his Summa Sacrae theologiae (3) that an attentive reader brought to our attention some time ago (4). Antonino Pierozzi of Florence (1389-1459), a Dominican (1405), founder of Saint Mark convent in Florence, consecrated Bishop of his native-born city in 1446, was canonized in 1523. His most famous work was, as mentioned, the Summa, written between 1440 and 1459. In the passages that here interest us, Saint Antoninus readily quotes Agostino Trionfo of Ancona (1243-1328), an Augustinian, to whom John XXII commissioned the Summa de Potestate ecclesiastica (written between 1324 and 1328) against the errors of Marsilio of Padua; Trionfo also defended, in one of his writings, the causes and the memory of Boniface VIII. The reader will realize that the famous distinction adopted by Father M.-L. Guérard des Lauriers regarding the papacy (materialiter-formaliter) which had already been found in the writings of the great commentators of St. Thomas, Cardinal Cajetan and John of St. Thomas (5), was also well known both to St. Antoninus and to Augustine Trionfo, the latter being a contemporary of St. Thomas.

Saint Peter, the first Supreme Pontiff, was elected immediately by Christ

First of all, let us remember the difference between Peter and all his successors, as regards election: that Peter was elected Pope directly by Christ, while all the others were elected by the Church (CAJETAN, De comparatione…, n.s 269, 284, 563 etc.) (10). It is Christ himself who gave Simon the name of Peter (Jn 1:42; Lk 6:14) explaining then – after the confession of faith in which the apostle, divinely assisted, proclaims the divinity of Jesus (6) – the meaning of this denomination: You are Peter, and on this Rock I will build my Church (Mt 16:18). Jesus Christ, who is the cornerstone on which the building must be built (Mt 21:42; Mk 12:10; Lk 20:17-18; Acts 4:11; Rm 9:31 ff; 1 Cor. 10:4; 1 Pt 2:4-8; cf. Ps 117:22), the unshakeable rock on which the house is founded (Mt 7:24 ff), promises Simon that he too will be, with Him, that Rock, and promises him the keys to the Kingdom of Heaven, that is, the Church, and the power to bind and to loose (Mt 16:19). What Christ promised, He kept, in His first appearance in Galilee, after the resurrection. Christ is the Good Shepherd, who gives his life for his sheep: there will be one sheepfold, under one shepherd, who is Jesus Christ (Jn 10:11-16). But Peter too, with Jesus Christ and like Him, becomes one with Him, and receives the task of feeding Christ’s flock: feed my lambs, feed my sheep (Jn 21:15-17). In the case of the apostle Peter alone, therefore, not only does the formal aspect of the papacy come immediately from Christ (ecce enim vobiscum sum: Mt 28, 20; pasce agnos meos, pasce oves meas: Jn 21, 15 17) but also the material one: designation and election (Tu es Petrus, Mt 16, 18).

The successors of Peter, are instead designated by the Church

The Popes following after Saint Peter are not designated immediately by Christ, but mediately by the Church; and since the Apostle Peter – by disposition of Divine Providence (Lamentabili, prop. 56, DS 3456; see Vatican I, Pastor Aeternus DS 3050) – placed his seat in Rome, by the Roman Church. Only the Pope, the successor of Peter, has the right to establish the modalities of this canonical designation. The ancient use of the Church provides that the Bishop, in this case the Bishop of Rome, is designated by the diocesan clergy and by the Bishops of the surrounding area: in fact, the cardinals who have had the exclusive right since 1059 to elect the Pope (7), represent the three orders of Roman clergy: cardinal deacons, cardinal presbyters, and cardinal bishops. The laity (the people, the emperor, etc.) have canonically had only a consultative role, not a deliberative one (see Sodalitium, no. 55, pp. 21-23). Let’s move on then to address the election or designation to the papacy.

The material aspect of the papacy: election

Since we chose to quote Saint Antoninus, let’s look at what the Dominican Bishop wrote: “… illud quod est in papatu materiale, quia papa mortuo potest collegium per electionem personam determinare ad papatum, ut sit talis vel talis”; “…si nomine papatus intelligimus personæ electionem et determinationem, quod est in papatu materiale…”; “…quantum ad personæ electionem et determinationem, quod est tamquam quid materiale”… Which means: “that which in the papacy is (the) material (aspect), when the Pope is dead, the college (of cardinals) can determine such and such a person by election.” “if by the term ‘papacy’ we mean the election and determination of a person, this, in the papacy, constitutes the material (aspect)”; “…as regards the election and determination of a person, which is like the material (aspect)”.​
Father Guérard des Lauriers did not therefore “invent” the distinction – in the papacy – between a material aspect and (as we shall see) a formal aspect (a distinction which, moreover, exists analogically for all created entities). In the material aspect of the papacy, therefore, there is the election of the Pontiff by a college of electors, and this election has the purpose of determining who, among the many who could be designated, is canonically elected to the papacy. In the article on the election of the Pope, published in n. 55 of Sodalitium, I recalled those who have the right to be part of said college of electors, and those who do not (8), but for now this matter does not interest us. We are rather interested in pointing out that the said election is carried out through the human, free and voluntary acts of the electors. In the same article I recalled – contrary to what is commonly believed – that the electors, although endowed with special graces, do not enjoy infallible divine assistance, so that their election can be invalid, doubtful, or, naturally, valid, but in fact not necessarily electing the best subject (p. 28). The electors, in short, as the history of Conclaves demonstrates, choose their candidate with – I repeat – a free act of their human will, subject to all the vicissitudes, contingencies, imperfections and defects of a human act.
With the canonical election the elect becomes designated to be Pope: he – and he alone, to the exclusion of anyone else – has the material aspect of the papacy from this election; he is ‘pope’, although only materialiter (9). Election, however, as we know, is not yet enough. The canonical acceptance of the election on the part of the elected is still necessary.

The acceptance of the election

The elected person is, in fact, not yet – formally – the Pope, but simply the person designated to be so. Cardinal Cajetan reminds us again: “three points must be made: firstly, in the Pope there are three elements, the papacy, the person who is Pope, for example Peter, and the union of these two elements, that is, the papacy in Peter, and Peter the Pope is the result of this union. Secondly: recognizing and applying each cause to its proper effect, we find that the papacy comes immediately from God, and Peter comes from his father, etc.; but the union of the papacy in Peter, after that first Peter who was instituted immediately by Christ, does not come from God but from man, as is evident; since it occurs through an election made by men. Two human consents concur to cause this effect, that is, that of the electors and that of the elect: in fact, it is necessary that the electors voluntarily elect and that the elect voluntarily accepts the election, otherwise nothing happens (nihil fit). Thus, the union of the papacy in Peter does not come from God in an immediate manner but through a human ministry, both on the part of the electors and on the part of the elect (…). From the fact that the union of the papacy with Peter is an effect of the human will, when that same effect constitutes Peter as Pope, it follows that although the Pope depends on his being and his becoming only on God (in esse et in fieri), nevertheless Pope Peter also depends on man in becoming such (in fieri). In fact Peter is made Pope by man when, once elected by men, the elect accepts, and thus the papacy is united with Peter” (10). Continuing his reasoning, Cajetan finds confirmation of this intervention of the human will in the “making” of a Pope in the inverse process, when with a single act of his will, in renouncing the papacy, Peter ceases to be Pope, separating the papacy from his person: “Peter the Pope, whose own cause exists through his consent and that of the electors, can be annulled by the same cause in the opposite direction” (11).​
Pope Pius XII’s Apostolic Constitution Vacantis Apostolicae Sedis (December 8, 1945) established: “After the canonically-made election (…) the Cardinal Deacon in the name of the entire Sacred College asks the elect for his consent with these words: ‘Do you accept the canonical election as Supreme Pontiff?’ Once this consent is given, within the time limit potentially fixed by a majority of votes at the prudent discretion of the Cardinals, the elect immediately becomes the Pope, and acquires in fact, and can exercise, full and absolute jurisdiction over the entire world” (nn. 100 and 101). “The Roman Pontiff, canonically elected, as soon as he accepts the election, obtains by divine right the fullness of the supreme power of jurisdiction.” (C.J.C. Can 219).
​Later we will see how and by whom the elect who accepts the election receives jurisdiction over the whole Church and becomes the true Pope; but for now let us focus on the necessity of accepting the election. In the period of time between the election and the acceptance, the elect possesses, as we have seen, in an exclusive way, the material aspect of the papacy, but does not yet possess the formal one. The elect can, de facto: accept the election, refuse the election, or neither accept or refuse the election. In the first case (acceptance), he becomes, if there are no obstacles, the true Pope; in the second case (refusal), he returns to the condition in which he found himself before the election and another can be elected in his place; in the third case, the most interesting, he remains the elect of the Conclave without yet being the Pope (‘pope’ materialiter, not formaliter) until he decides to accept or refuse. This, as we will see, is the situation in which the Church and the papacy currently finds itself (12).

The elect is made Pope by God, and not by the Church

The election of a person to the papacy comes from the Church, through a human act of the electors: the acceptance of the election also comes from a man, through a human act of consent to the election by the will of the elect; but the formal element of the papacy, that which constitutes such a person as Pope, the Vicar of Christ and successor of Peter, does not come from man, and not from below, but from Christ, and from above. Canon 219, already cited, recalls this: “The Roman Pontiff, legitimately elected, as soon as the election is accepted (this is the material aspect that comes from man) obtains by divine right the fullness of the supreme power of jurisdiction” (and this is the formal aspect of the papacy): “iure divino”, not “iure humano” or ecclesiastical. As we shall see, the Church as well as the electoral college, does not have the supreme ecclesiastical power that belongs to the Pope, and therefore even they cannot communicate it to him; it resides in Christ, Head of the Church, the only one able to communicate it to Peter.

According to Father Guérard des Lauriers, what does the papacy formally consist of (its formal aspect)

According to the Code of Canon Law, as we just stated, the Pope is such because he receives from God “the fullness of the supreme power of jurisdiction”. The Church, and the Authority within the Church, are presented here primarily insofar as the Church militant is a “human collective”, a visible and perfect society. We obviously adhere to this proposition which is not only a juridical fact, but also an act of Faith. A fact of Faith which can, however, be further explored. We will do this by following the Dominican theologian M.-L. Guérard des Lauriers (13). He recalls, as Pius XII did in his encyclical Mystici Corporis, that the Church is primarily, as an object of faith, the “Mystical Body of Christ” (14). Of this body, Christ is the Head. The head governs the body: it follows – and this we must never forget – that “the divine government is exercised in the Church by Christ, who is the Head of the Church” (Cahiers de Cassiciacum, n. 1, p. 47) [henceforth abbreviated C.d.C. in this article]. In this body of His, which is the Church, Christ, as its Head, communicates divine Life to all its members, the supernatural life of grace: whosoever receives this divine life, and does not place an obstacle to this communication, becomes “a member of Christ, and ‘son in the Son’” (p. 47), that is, an adoptive son of God in His only-begotten and natural Son who is Jesus Christ. “This Communication is, in itself, divine Life. It can, in general temporarily, be reduced to the Communication that ‘the Author of Faith’ makes of the grace of Faith. Whoever has Faith, even dead Faith, remains a member of the Church” (p. 45, note 36). But there is a second communication that proceeds from Christ to the Church: from this point of view, the Authority in the Church is also formally constituted by a Communication that comes to it from its Head, who is Christ. In fact, “Nothing subsists in the Church except in relation to Christ, who is its Head” (p. 44) (15). This Communication is different from the preceding one, but is also attested to by Sacred Scripture:
“And behold, I am with you all days, even unto the consummation of the world” (Mt 28, 20). Jesus “is with” His apostles – and eminently with their leader, Saint Peter – “all days”, habitually, daily, in the fulfillment of their mission, which is that which Christ himself received from the Father: “All power is given to me in heaven and on earth. Go, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you” (Mt 28, 20): “Whosoever believes and is baptized, will be saved; whosoever does not believe, will be condemned” (Lk 16, 16). “Saint Mark (16,20) – notes Father Guérard – confirms this ‘being with’, post factum: ‘And they going forth (after the Ascension) preached everywhere, the Lord working withal (του κυριου συνεργουντος: the Lord being in unity of act with them)…’”. For this the Lord can say in all truth: “Whosoever listens to you, listens to me” (Lk 10,16). What constitutes the Pope as head of the Church in act, is the “being with” that was promised by Christ. “Christ spoke in the present tense: ‘I am with!’, with those from whom He demands that they be with Him: ‘Whosoever is not with me, is against me’. It is the same ‘being with’ that, by its nature, demands reciprocity” (p. 37).
​Christ, therefore, is always present in His Body, which is the Church: in its members, communicating to them the life of grace, or at least the supernatural gift of Faith; in its visible head, in the Authority, communicating to him His “being with” in a habitual and daily manner (16). Christ sanctifies as Priest, governs as King, and teaches as Prophet, Master and Doctor, “together with the Authority”: whosoever listens to you, listens to me, whosoever welcomes you, welcomes me, whosoever despises you, despises me. And this not only in an extraordinary way, as, for example, when the charism of infallibility is exercised, but habitually and daily, a habitual (“I am with you”) state (17).
​“And the religious and theological submission that is due to the Authority in the collective Church and only in it (18), is founded formaliter on the fact that the Authority is supposed to habitually receive the Communication of ‘being with’ that proceeds from Christ. It is to Christ Himself, in the Authority, that the submission is addressed; since Christ ‘is with’ the Authority: ‘Whosoever listens to you, listens to me’ (Lk 10,16). This, we repeat, presupposes of course that the Authority habitually receives the communication of ‘being with’, which alone constitutes formaliter the Authority” (C.d.C., pp 46-47).

The papacy during Sede vacante. The Church during Sede vacante

So far we have examined how the Pope is made, what the material aspect of the papacy is, and what the formal one is. Before dealing with the acceptance of the election, and the communication, by Christ, Head of the Church, of His presence (being with) to the Pope, let us see what happens, instead, in a period of Sede vacante. This is what Saint Antoninus explicitly inquires into, always following the tracks of Agostino Trionfo.
​The Holy Doctor makes a threefold distinction with regard to the “potestas” [authority] of the Pope: there is the material element (the election and the determination of the elect), the formal element (jurisdiction and authority) and the element both material and formal, the actual exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the elect. Now, explains Saint Antoninus, at the death of the Pope (or after his resignation, or anyway in a period of Sede vacante), neither the formal element nor the material element “dies”, but what “dies”, so to speak, is the union of the formal and material element that consists in the actual exercise of jurisdiction. Allow me to explain. During Sede vacante, the material element – the election and the determination of the subject to occupy the See – does not “die”, that is, it does not disappear, but persists with its roots in the “college” (a moral entity) that can elect the Pope: normally the college of cardinals (the college of cardinals as a proximate root, the Church as a remote root). Neither is the formal element “dead” nor has it disappeared: “if by the term ‘papal authority’ we mean its authority and jurisdiction, which is its formal element, such power never dies, because it remains in Christ, who, having resurrected from the dead, dies no more”. What dies upon the death of the Pope, however, is the union between the material and formal element: “but if by the term ‘papal power’ we mean the actual exercise, which is something material and formal in the papacy, then the actual exercise effectively dies when the Pope dies, because, the Pope being dead, the actual exercise of papal power does not remain in the college, except to the extent established by its predecessors, nor does it remain, according to this modality, in Christ, since ordinarily, after His resurrection, Christ does not exercise such power except through the Pope: in effect, although Christ is the door, he has appointed Peter and His successors as gatekeepers, through whom the door that allows access to Him is opened and closed.” And Saint Antoninus summarizes and concludes: “The power of the Church does not die, therefore, when the Pope dies, as regards jurisdiction, which is its formal element, but remains in Christ; and neither does it die as to the election and the determination of a person, which is its material element, as this remains in the college of cardinals, but the actual exercise of his jurisdiction dies because with the death of the Pope the Church is vacant (Ecclesia vacat) and is deprived of the exercise of such authority (et privatur administrationis talis potestatis)”. The Church is – according to the words of Father Guérard – in a “state of privation” of authority.
​Let us take an example: on October 9, 1958, Pope Pius XII died. On that day, the Church – without changing the essence willed by Christ himself – passed from one state to another: in the morning of that day it was governed by Pius XII, in the evening it was deprived of its Shepherd (viduata Pastore). With this change, had Papal power also changed? The elements that were united in the person of Pius XII were now separated. The authority proper to Pius XII – his jurisdiction and, above all, as we have seen, Christ’s “being with” him – was no longer in him, since he was dead, but remained, so to speak, always alive in Christ, Head of the Church, His mystical Body, in order to be able to give it to His legitimate successor. The designation of the person to the papacy, which took effect at the 1939 conclave, now, with the coming of his death, no longer had any effect; but this material element remained in its roots in the college of Cardinals. Those Cardinals, who in 1939 elected Cardinal Pacelli, designating him in preference to any other, together with those Cardinals created in the meantime by Pius XII, could and should now elect another in his place. But neither the college of Cardinals nor the Episcopal body nor the Church, who were widowed of their supreme Shepherd on earth, had the exercise of papal jurisdiction that evening. This “actualis administratio” could undoubtedly “rise again” in the person of the legitimate successor to Pius XII, but for the moment it was – according to the words of Saint Antoninus – as “dead” with the deceased Pope. In fact, although during the Sede vacante those who had jurisdiction normally retain it (19), nonetheless no one enjoys the jurisdiction and authority proper to the Supreme Pontiff. No one has the primacy of jurisdiction over all the Church: neither the College of Cardinals, nor the Episcopal body, nor an Ecumenical Council, which without the Roman Pontiff cannot even be convoked (20). No one, neither the College of Cardinals, nor the Episcopal body, nor the Council, nor the Camerlengo, enjoys that supreme papal authority proper to the monarchical (and not collegial) constitution of the Church. Neither does anyone enjoy the charism of papal infallibility: neither the College of Cardinals, nor the Episcopal body, whether dispersed around the world, or gathered in Council, since this body lacks its head, which is the Roman Pontiff. Similarly lacking is the supreme ecclesiastical legislator, who is always the Roman Pontiff, and who regulates ecclesiastical discipline and worship in the Church. From this point of view, whether or not the power of jurisdiction or magisterium exists in the episcopal body is, of course, irrelevant. We amply developed this question in n. 56 of Sodalitium (pp 22-24). The indefectibility of the Church (21), therefore, does not require the permanence, in the subordinate episcopate, of ordinary jurisdiction or of the magisterial power (although such permanence is, obviously, very useful), but only and exclusively the permanence of an electoral body that can designate a true and legitimate Roman Pontiff (since the “being with” remains in Christ). During the period of an ordinary Sede vacante (e.g. at the death of the Pope), as well as during the period in which the See is occupied, as it is now, however with the elect not having received the Authority from Christ, what Father Guérard writes remains valid: “if Christ no longer exercises the Communication of ‘being with’ which formaliter constitutes Authority, it does not follow that Christ is no longer governing the Church militant. He governs it provisionally in a manner different than through the Authority: His ‘being with’ its members who ‘are with’ Him…” (C.d.C., n.1 p. 57). We have seen in fact that even for Saint Antoninus, during normal Sede vacante Christ governs the Church in a different way from how He “ordinarily” governs it (that is, through the Pope). Christ always rules the Church militant: “ordinarily” through the Authority of the Pope, provisionally without him, but in a way such that the ordinary modality can be reestablished. The considerations set out in this short chapter, respond exhaustively to some objections recently raised to the Thesis, which essentially repeat those raised by Father Cantoni in 1980 (22).

Christ communicates His “being with”, His presence, to the elect who truly accepts the election

Let us return to the election of the Pope. We have seen that the material element consists in the designation by the electors of this subject to the papacy; we have seen that the formal element consists rather in the communication of the “being with” on the part of Christ to the elect of the conclave (with all that it entails: assistance, primacy of jurisdiction, infallibility); we have also seen that for the elect to effectively become the Pope, it is necessary for him to accept the canonical election of his person (can. 209; Pius XII, Vacantis Apostolicæ Sedis nn. 100 and 101). This is clear, and apparently it is all too clear. In fact, if we admit, for example, that Paul VI was canonically elected, there can be no doubt of the fact that he effectively accepted the election, and therefore became the Supreme Pontiff, receiving from Christ the communication of His “being with”.
​Ordinarily, in fact, no one asks the question about the acceptance given by the elect, if it has taken place externally; the most one is concerned with (and this is already indicative) is that the ritual “accepto” [“I accept”] is pronounced without any shadow of ambiguity. Thus, for example, when Cardinal Sarto – who was to become the great Saint Pius X – responded to the question of the Camerlengo with the following words: “accepto in crucem” [“I accept on the cross”], since the papacy appeared before him as a terrible cross on which to be sacrificed. The Camerlengo – not satisfied with the response, which however was affirmative – then insisted on being absolutely certain of his acceptance. The law, as far as I know, asks for nothing more than an external acceptance. But the law does not abolish, nor can it abolish, the nature of things. Acceptance, therefore, retains its nature as a human act, and must be considered as such.

What it really means to accept the election

Accepting the election is therefore a human act, an act of intelligence and will, with which the elect voluntarily accepts the papacy, which includes knowing what the papacy is and the will to carry out that role. A person without the use of reason, for example, would be incapable of accepting the election and the pontificate, since he is incapable of performing such a human act, and therefore also of understanding what his acceptance implies. When the elect of a conclave accepts his election to the Supreme Pontificate, by accepting the election, he also accepts, and makes his own, the role and function of the Supreme Pontiff, which is independent of his will, but is found in the nature of things. Whoever accepts the papacy accepts to be the pope, to realize the purpose of this office, which is not up to him to invent, but is determined by God. Let us explain this better.

The essence of temporal authority: procuring the common good

In the temporal society, authority is necessary to realize the ends of the said society: the temporal common good. Authority, in order to be such, must have the will to realize the ends of the society itself, the common good. Such intention must be objective – that is, it must concern the acts to be taken to achieve the said ends and not the subjective intention that animates it – it must be real – that is, it must actually achieve, at least in essence, the common good – and it must be stable, and therefore habitual, because it must govern society in a stable manner. “Authority, defined by its proper function of ensuring the unity of action of its members (of the society) with a view to the common good, is formally constituted by the specific relationship that the head has with the common good. This relationship has as its foundation precisely the habitual intention, objective and real, of procuring the said common good” (B. LUCIEN, La situation actuelle de l’Autorité dans l’Église. La Thèse de Cassiciacum. Documents de Catholicité, 1985, pp. 34-35). In short, authority is in relation to the common good to be realized, and the foundation of this relationship is the intention (objective, real, habitual) to achieve it: so that authority that does not have the said intention is not authority, or ceases to be. The right to command, and the duty to obey, necessarily presuppose that authority is essentially related to the achievement of the common good (ib. p. 39).

Authority in the State and authority in the Church: Analogy, Similarities, Differences

There is an analogy between temporal society and the Church, and between temporal authority and the Pope (that is: something similar and, even more, something different). The Church is also a society, and in it too, Authority is necessarily related to the ends of this divinely founded society. From a human point of view: “the Church is a human collective, in the sense that it is composed of human beings who, by grace and free choice, have a common End. This End, which can be called Divine Good, is the Glory of God realized in the sanctification of the members that compose it. The Church entails an Authority, divinely instituted with a view to the Divine Good whose realization is entrusted to the Church. This authority is separated into three branches; it is exercised in two ways: ordinary, extraordinary; and is made up of a hierarchical group of consecrated persons” (C.d.C. pp. 42-43). Up to this point, the dissimilarities between the Church and the State are already visible, however from “this point of view” the Church is still “similar to any human collective”, particularly in the fact that “the relationship between the Authority and the Good-End is the foundation and the norm of all the ordinances that emanate from the Authority”. If the Authority realizes the end, it must be obeyed: if the Authority does not realize the end, it loses its reason for being. In fact, Father Guérard notes, this is how “the faithful, the priests, the bishop, who remained faithful to Tradition” behaved, no longer submitting to, and even resisting, an “authority” that no longer achieved the purpose and the good of the Church (p. 44). A former confrere pointed out that the argument can, however, be used to reach the opposite conclusion: sometimes it is necessary to obey a government that in many points does not achieve the common good, if only to ensure public order and avoid anarchy. We have already answered him (Sodalitium n. 62, pp. 24-31). There is a capital difference between Authority in the Church and in the State. In the Church, a supernatural society, Authority is constituted by “being with”: by the fact that Jesus is with the Church, is with the Authority, is with the Pope, which cannot be said of temporal, even consecrated, authority. In the Church, the intention to achieve the common good is not the essence of Authority, but is a necessary condition of it. In the Church, let us repeat, “being with” is the essence of authority, while the intention to achieve the common good is not the essence but the sine qua non condition and sign of the fact that Christ is with the Authority; we would fall into a dangerous naturalism if we were to reduce the Church to its natural aspect as a human collective, in which the legitimacy of authority depends only on the effective purpose that it must have to achieve the common good, confusing the reality of Authority proper to the Church to that which is only a condition, albeit a necessary one (see C.d.C. pp. 57-64). Since temporal authority does not govern “with Christ”, as does the Church, it is understood that it can still be legitimate, despite the observance of very serious deficiencies, and that one can at times resist the authority (for example, refusing the “laws” on abortion, or in the times of paganism, sacrificing to idols), and at times obey it (for example paying – just – taxes); this is not the same case as the authority of the Pope, where the “being with” ensures habitual divine assistance.
​The Pope must want to realize that divine good which is the purpose of the Church. A necessary condition not realized is an obstacle to the communication of Authority to the one elected by the Conclave.
​Let’s get back to us. We said that the elect must accept the election to Supreme Pontiff: he must accept the Supreme Pontificate. The sine qua non condition, absolutely necessary to this acceptance, is then the objective intention, real and habitual, to procure the Good-End of the Church. One might object that such a condition is not found in theology or canon law manuals. It is, however, found in the nature of things. Acceptance is a human act. Each human act has an object knowable by the intellect, upon which the will is directed. The Supreme Pontificate is aimed at the realization of that purpose of the Church, the divine Good, assigned to it by Christ Himself. After having recalled the relationship between the act of faith and the arguments of credibility (“Faith requires rational justification which, on the other hand, transcends. Reason does not ground the Faith; but one must not believe without reason”). Father Guérard explains: “That Christ exercises the Communication towards Authority that constitutes it formaliter Authority, that it is consequently necessary to be subjected to this Authority, is an object of Faith. But to make this act of Faith requires it to be reasonably founded. One cannot believe that Christ exercises the Communication that constitutes the Authority, unless the latter realizes the condition for this Communication to be exercised. And the sign, which can be observed, that the Authority realizes this condition, consists in the fact that it habitually has the purpose of realizing the divine Good. One can, indeed one must, apply to Authority what Leo XIII observed: ‘One cannot judge the intention, which by its nature is internal; but one must make a judgment to the extent in which it manifests itself externally’. Thus, for every object of Faith, in particular for the existence of the Authority, the act of believing must be well-founded by the signs of credibility that on the other hand it must transcend” (C.d.C. p. 63).
​In other words. Normally, the faithful have no need to ascertain whether the elect of a Conclave has really accepted the election to the Supreme Pontificate. This goes without saying. But this does not take away from the fact that such acceptance includes, by its nature, an intention in the elect, the pope materialiter, and a condition that must be realized: he must have the objective intention (that which concerns external acts, the finis operis as they say, the finality of the act rather than that of the operator), real (that is, operative, in its facts) and habitual (or constant, which admits a greater or lesser realization, more or less perfect, but always habitual and constant of the aforementioned intention) to realize the ends of the Church, the divine good; and this by having the Divine Sacrifice celebrated by the Church, by giving true doctrine to souls (therefore condemning errors), by sanctifying souls with the sacraments, by governing them with laws. “If this purpose is not real, that is to say if the ‘authority’ does not habitually seek to realize its ‘Relationship’ with the Good-End how it should be, then the ‘authority’ is no longer a subject metaphysically capable of receiving the Communication ‘of being with’ that could be exercised by Christ; and since this Communication cannot be received, it is not exercised. The Shepherd, even if he let them act, ‘is not with’ the wolves. Christ ‘is not with’ those who destroy the Church. Christ is not divided against Himself.” (C.d.C. p. 56)

Examples (and analogies) of a consent that is only verbal and apparent, but not real

The elect of the Conclave must, therefore, give his consent to the election; this is well-known and indisputable. However by its nature, this consent must not only be verbal, and therefore apparent, but real: verbis et factis. That is, it must have as its object the end and good of the Church, which the elect of the Conclave must objectively have the intention of realizing. The same good/end of the Church then must be realized not only verbis – by word – but also factis, in deeds. In the case of Paul VI, notes Father Guérard “the ‘verba’ serves only to ensure the efficacy of the ‘facta’” (C.d.C. n.1 p 68). The at times reassuring words (verba) of Paul VI served concretely – and this in a habitual and constant manner – to bring about diametrically opposed facts (facta) (23).​
To allow the reader to better understand what has been said, let’s look at some analogies together.
​Justification. This analogy was forgotten in the years following the first publication of the Father Guérard’s Thesis, and yet it is the one that the Dominican theologian himself precisely presents in n. 1 of Cahiers de Cassiciacum. In fact, as we have seen, Christ, as Head of the Mystical Body, exercises a dual communication with regard to His Body: that of grace with respect to all the members of His Mystical Body, and that, which we are studying, of “being with” (which belongs to the graces “gratis datæ”) with respect to the Authority. It goes without saying that there must be an analogy between the two communications. Here is how Father Guérard des Lauriers expresses it: “In the same way in which a human being is constituted a member of the human collective, the Church militant, only by receiving from the Head of the Church the Communication of Life, so the Authority is constituted the Authority of the Church militant only by habitually receiving the ‘being with’ that Christ communicates to it. The ‘subjects’, that is, the members of the Church militant or the ‘Authority of the Church’, exist materialiter as ‘subjects’ even before the Communication that proceeds from Christ; but they are formaliter members of the Church or Authority of the Church only in virtue of and in the Act of Communication that is exercised by the Head of the Church.
​It is possible for a human being to refuse the Communication of Life that proceeds from Christ. This is possible because, as the Council of Trent observes: ‘although Christ died for all (2 Cor 5, 15), only those to whom the merit of His Passion is communicated receive the fruit of His death’ (De Justificatione, chapter 3; Denz 1523). And if a human being refuses the Communication that proceeds from the Head of the Church, he is in no way a member of the Church, although it is possible for him to become one. Similarly, the ‘authority’ who refuses the Communication of ‘being with’ that proceeds from the Head of the Church, would not be in any way the Authority of the Church. He could be so materialiter, as a ‘subject’ in whom it is not impossible that he become the Authority; but this ‘subject’, deprived of that which constitutes formaliter the Authority in the Church, would have no Authority in the Church. The analogy that we have indicated concerns states. To be a member of the Church is a state; to be the Authority in the Church is a state. The Communication of Life or of ‘being with’ that proceeds from Christ involves, as regards its reception in each of the ‘subjects’ respectively interested, who can always refuse it, a first instant; but, once inaugurated, it is habitual in the ‘subject’, who is its terminus, as it is permanent in Christ who is its principle” (C.d.C. n. 1 pp. 44-45) (24).
​In simple terms, one becomes a member of the Church, the Mystical Body, by receiving grace (or at least Faith) from Christ; however it is possible on the part of the man to place an obstacle to the reception of grace or faith; analogously, the elect of the Conclave can place an obstacle to the communication of the “being with” that constitutes the Authority in the Church. And just as Scripture states that “Christ died for all”, and yet not all are saved by receiving grace, so too it is written “I will be with you”, but the communication of this “being with” can be hindered by man (see C.d.C. p. 56 and, on the relationship between the act of Christ and the consent of man, pp. 50-51). ​
The necessary intention in the sacraments, or other possible obstacles, and the case of marital consent in particular. Father Bernard Lucien and Father Hervé Belmont, as is well known, presented another interesting analogy based on marital consent (25). The argument, as we will see once again, is particularly fitting, since the sacrament of marriage (and also natural marriage) is constituted by a human act, the consent of the spouses, just as the acceptance of the election is constituted by a human act. On closer inspection, however, the argument is valid for all the sacraments. It is well known that the sacrament acts ex opere operato, or by the very fact of providing its elements, matter and form, by the very action of Christ, the author of grace and institutor of the sacraments. This does not, however, prevent the fact that the sacraments could be invalid, or partially ineffective, due to an obstacle (obex) placed by the man. Among these obstacles, it is necessary to point out the intention, or rather, the absence of a true intention, not only in the minister who confers the sacrament, but also in the subject who receives it, as in, for example, an attachment to sin in the one who receives the sacrament. Whoever receives the sacrament of baptism in an apparently regular manner, but who has an explicit intention of absolutely not receiving the sacrament, would receive it invalidly (he would not be validly baptized, he would not receive the sanctifying grace, nor the baptismal character). Whoever comes to be baptized having the intention of receiving baptism, but rather who retains an attachment to sin (thereby willingly placing an obex, an obstacle) would receive the baptismal character, but not the sanctifying grace (a reference also in C.d.C. n. 1, p. 24). In the sacrament of penance, the lack of sufficient sorrow (attrition) on the part of the penitent, invalidates the sacrament (since the penitent’s acts constitute the quasi-matter of the sacrament). The most fitting example, however, is that of marriage, which is caused precisely by the consent of the contracting parties. The consent must be external, but it is not enough that it is only external: a defect of consent, even if only in one of the contracting parties, renders the consent invalid and therefore also the marriage. The situation of the putative spouses, however, is not the same after the marriage consent, even if only apparent and invalid. If, in reality and before God, they are not married (and therefore – if they are aware of the fact – they cannot consider themselves married and cannot, in conscience, exercise the conjugal act, the object of the contract) nevertheless juridically and before the Church they are still considered united by the marital bond (in virtue of the consent given externally before witnesses) until the same bond is canonically declared null by legitimate ecclesiastical authority. And not only this. Their exterior consent, though invalid by the defect of consent or by a diriment impediment, nevertheless has consequences. First of all, as mentioned, the putative spouses are juridically required to respect the marital bond until a legal declaration of nullity; an eventual new marriage would be invalid for this reason. Subsequently, the offspring born of this only apparent and legal union by the two putative spouses is considered legitimate, as if they had been born in a valid marriage. And finally, if it is possible to remove the obstacle which rendered their consent null, (a defect of consent of one of the spouses or both, or an impediment dispensable by the Church, or one that can in any case cease) the two putative spouses can, once the obstacle is removed, convalidate their marriage, sometimes even by just renewing the consent, this time validly, even without further external ceremonies (can. 1036 § 2). The similarities in the case we are examining should immediately strike the reader.​
The elect of the Conclave must give his external assent to the election of his person to the pontificate, just as the spouses must externally express their consent to the marriage contract. Normally, the canonical statement of consent is sufficient, and no one questions it. Juridically, before the Church, the elect of the Conclave is normally considered the Supreme Pontiff, just as the two spouses are considered legitimately married. However, due to a defect in the consent or some canonical impediment, representing an obstacle to the consent having its effect and validity, it is possible that the marriage consent is null, before God and in the consciences of the spouses who were aware of it; in particular, if the intention of the contracting parties is in some way not related to the object of the marriage contract, but to something that alters its substance. Similarly, the elect of the Conclave can “spoil” his consent, placing an obstacle to the reception of the “being with” on the part of Christ, by not having the objective and habitual intention of realizing the good/end of the Church. It follows that, just as the putative spouses are not really married, so the “pope” materialiter is not truly and formally Pope, he is not the Authority, he is not “with Christ” in directing the Church. The putative spouses, however, are not found in the same condition as they found themselves before their exterior, though invalid, consent, expressed before the Church: for example, they cannot validly contract new marriages until the nullity of the previous bond is declared; their offspring are legitimate; in certain cases it is possible, by removing the obstacle, to render their consent and their marriage valid. Similarly, the elect of the Conclave who only exteriorly, and not truly, gave his consent to the election, is not in the same state as he was before the Conclave (when he was not the elect) and before the acceptance (when he was only the elect without yet having accepted). He is “putative” Pontiff, or “pope” materialiter; the See is occupied by him and cannot be occupied by anyone else unless the election is declared null by the Church. Some juridical acts indispensable for the life of the Church can have juridical effect (either in themselves, or by Christ’s suppliance, as Head of the Church) (26). And finally, in certain cases he can make his acceptance of the election valid provided that he removes the obstacle he previously placed by vitiating his consent (providing that it is by nature possible to remove it). Of course, analogies are only analogies (in which the differences between the objects are greater than the similarities), but it must be admitted that this example is truly persuasive and easy to understand.
​The intention for the elect of the Conclave to accept episcopal consecration. Canonists would search in vain in the Apostolic Constitutions on the election of the Pope for mention of this “condition” for the validity of the election; none of them mention it, not even Pius XII. Yet, Pius XII himself, in a speech to Catholic lay people, oftentimes quoted (27), had the opportunity to explain that if a lay person were elected to the Supreme Pontificate, he would immediately become the Supreme Pontiff, with universal jurisdiction, at the very moment of his acceptance of the election, even before receiving priestly ordination and episcopal consecration (let us remember this against those who write that the Thesis would be outdated today if one were to hypothesize that Ratzinger was not validly consecrated and Bergoglio validly ordained; see Sodalitium n. 63, pp 46 ff). However, Pius XII specified that in accepting the election, the said layman must necessarily have the intention to receive episcopal consecration (Pius XII did not say that he must receive consecration, but must have the intention of receiving episcopal consecration), because the Pope is the Bishop of Rome, and must be so, normally, both with regard to the power of jurisdiction and the power of orders. Being deprived of the power of orders does not deprive him of the Pontificate; but to have an intention contrary to the Pontificate (for example, having the intention that the Pontiff be a lay person and not a Bishop), vitiates his consent and therefore prevents the only apparently consenting elected person from formally being the Authority. Even more so, the habitual and objective intention of not wanting the good/end of the Church, that is, that for which he should be the Authority, vitiates the consent to the election and impedes the Communication of “being with” by Christ, which formally constitutes the Authority in the Church.

Conclusion: God cannot force a “subject” incapable of receiving the Communication of “being with” (and therefore receiving the Authority) to be able to receive it (for as long as there remains an obstacle rendering him incapable)

Someone will object that what has been said about the election of the Pope is not found in canon law (it would be better to say the Apostolic Constitutions regarding the election of the Pope, since canon law, understood as Code, does not treat the question) or in classical authors. As to law, we have already given the example taken from the speech by Pius XII to the lay congress. As for “classical” authors, let us point out once again that the completely new situation in which we find ourselves requires a theological approach different from that – for example – of the “hypotheses of a heretical Pope”: Vidigal da Silveira himself (28) recognized this, being among the first to revive theological studies on the subject and he is still continually cited and plundered by his followers; theology and the history of theology are two different sciences (and theology consists at times at least in reflecting and not just repeating, as Father Guérard des Lauriers recalled, C.d.C., n. 1 p. 30). This is enough to refute, once again, philosophical and theological voluntarism (29).​
Finally, we point out also that the first of positive laws, and of theological authority, is the metaphysics of being:​
“Christ no longer exercises the Communication of ‘being with’ towards that ‘subject’ who, while occupying the Seat of Authority, does not satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions to receive from Christ that which, formaliter, would constitute him as the Authority. ‘Communication’ is by nature an act common to the one who communicates and the one who receives. God, who is ‘He who is’ (Ex. 3, 14) cannot make the laws of being not to be. If it is not possible for the Communication to be received, whatever the reason, then it is not exercised. One must accept it or reject it” (p. 56).

Proof of the Thesis (non-probative arguments, inductive proof, deductive proofs)
​
Most so-called “sedevacantists” think they can demonstrate with certainty the vacancy of the Apostolic See with varying arguments; among the principle ones is the theological hypothesis of the “heretical Pope”, or the one drawn from the Bull “Cum ex apostolatus” by Pope Paul IV, or finally by the measures against heretics provided for by the code of canon law (can. 188 4th and can. 2314 § 1), which on the other hand take up, in large part, the aforementioned Carafian Bull.​
The first issue of the Cahiers de Cassiciacum (pp. 76-87; see also pp. 22, 30, 36s) explains why these arguments, although “impressive especially for their convergence” (p. 36), are not conclusive with certainty, then referring to issues 3-4 for an in-depth examination of the different “pathologies of faith” (schism and heresy, which was to be followed by a study on modernism as a “pathology of faith”). Father B. Lucien subsequently exposed and refuted each of these arguments in detail (30).​
Let us then recall what the inductive argument is – which concludes with certainty (although with that “probable certainty” which is proper to induction). Paul VI is not the Authority, is not the Pope formaliter, because he does not have the “being with” Jesus Christ, Head of the Church. And he does not have the “being with” Jesus Christ, Head of the Church, because he does not have the habitual and objective intention to realize the good/end of the Church, an intention that constitutes the “sine qua non” condition to be the Authority in the Church. Authority, whatever it may be, temporal or spiritual, is never an end in itself, or as they say today, self-referential. Authority is, by nature, aimed at the common good of the society that it must govern. In fact, a society composed of disparate members must be directed to an end by the Authority, and this end is the common good. “Some want to reduce authority to the subject who is designated as the head, obscuring or forgetting its proper real relationship to the common good. But it must be recognized that such an ‘authority’ thus conceived does not possess the right to command, and is not capable of creating obligations in ‘subordinates’ (…) the doctrine admitted by all, according to which authority has the right to command and oblige its subordinates, necessarily supposes that authority is, in essence, essentially related to the realization of the common good” LUCIEN op. cit., pp. 38-39).
Authority achieves the common good through human acts, therefore voluntary. “This deliberate will to perform the act is what we call objective and real (or effective) intention. ‘Objective’ to distinguish it from the ‘subjective’ intention which concerns the reason for which the person acts. This ‘subjective’ intention can remain, partially or even totally, inaccessible to the external observer, while the ‘objective’ intention, which refers immediately to the act which is performed and not to the reasons for performing the act, can be the object of discernment by the external observer, if not absolutely in all cases, at least in the majority of them” (LUCIEN op. cit., p. 34). Therefore: OBJECTIVE intention, and not subjective: “what a man does, is what he wants, in reality: such is the norm of objective intention” (ibid.) (31). Furthermore, just as society is a permanent reality in itself, so too the authority, which is an element inherent to its essence, must be a stable and permanent reality. The function that defines authority therefore involves a set of acts produced over time, converging towards the same common good. (…) This stable deliberate will (…) we designated by the name of habitual intention” (LUCIEN op. cit., p. 35).​
Put simply (and therefore perhaps less precisely). Each society requires an authority. The authority is not an end in itself; it has the task of providing for the common good of the society. It provides the common good through voluntary acts, which in a convergent and habitual manner, and not rare and episodic, effectively realize the common good. An authority that de facto – really and efficaciously – realizes the common good of the society that it governs, has the right to the obedience of its subjects; an “authority” that habitually, and not in an episodic or rare way, does NOT realize the common good of the society that it must direct, that common good which is its very reason for being, is NO LONGER formally the authority, and no longer has the right to the obedience and submission of the members of the society. And this is regardless of the subjective REASONS for which the “authority” acts in this way, which is not up to private individuals to judge and which may also be – subjectively – full of good intentions, Deus scit. What has been said applies to every authority, even the temporal authority of the State, and therefore it will also apply to spiritual authority: grace does not suppress nature, but perfects it. The authority of the Church, in fact, enjoys a divine assistance that temporal authority does not enjoy, rather it is constituted by the fact of ‘being with’ Jesus Christ, the Head of the Church: of carrying out one thing with Him, morally speaking: governing, sanctifying, and teaching the Church, and thus leading it to its ultimate end which is the glory of God and the realization of the ‘mission’ entrusted by the Father to Jesus Christ of the salvation of souls through the teaching of the revealed Truth, the celebration of the Sacrifice, the administration of the sacraments, and the practice of Christian life. Temporal authority – while nevertheless deriving its authority from God – does not enjoy the ‘being with’ promised by Christ to the Church, and can therefore possibly ensure a minimum of common good together with very serious vices, for which its subjects are authorized and required not to obey unjust laws: it is better to obey God than men. On the contrary, the Authority in the Church “is with” Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ “is with” it, in a habitual and daily manner, for which it habitually and daily realizes the good/end of the Church, the Mission entrusted by the Father to Christ, and which Christ gives to the Church (As the Father has sent Me, so I send you: go, teach, baptize…). It is possible that for a specific act, with the exception of the extraordinary Magisterium, the Authority may present defects (32); however it is not possible that the Authority who is one with Christ may not habitually ensure the Good of the Church. “What we are expounding is, on the other hand, an evident fact, namely that in the Church, Authority is divinely instituted, and that ultimately it is exercised, albeit indirectly, by Him who is the Truth. It is impossible that, in the Church, HABITUALLY, the Authority does not carry out the functions that are proper to the Authority. Such a hypothesis is contradictory, contrary to that principle of noncontradiction which has value not only in the natural order but in the order whose permanent principle is the Incarnate Word (see note 20 of the C.d.C.). If, therefore, the ‘authority’ habitually fails to carry out the functions that are proper to the Authority, it follows that the ‘authority’ is not the Authority; since, if the ‘authority’ were the Authority, it should, by virtue of the ‘being with’ promised to it, habitually carry out the functions that are proper to the Authority…”. In fact, all so-called “traditionalists” (understood as Catholics who oppose Vatican II and the new liturgy), including Archbishop Lefebvre, have acted and act as if the ‘authority’ were not the Authority, since – from Paul VI onwards – the faithful and the Church were no longer assured of doctrine, the Mass, the sacraments, discipline, nor defense from heresy and heretics. “Ecône – Father Guérard noted – by its existence, concretely testifies to what we intelligibly affirm”. Concluding however, ‘prophetically’ that “if Archbishop Lefebvre refuses to admit that the ‘authority’ is not the Authority, it will follow sooner or later inexorably that Ecône will be either emptied or amalgamated” (33).​
Note how the inductive argument in question (the only one put forward by Father Guérard des Lauriers in the first typewritten version of the Thesis – not yet ‘of Cassiciacum’ – dated March 26, 1978) is in itself convincing, independent of all the (subsequent) discussions on the infallibility of the magisterium, and the diatribes relating to possible “accidental moments of weakness” (but not habitual) on the part of the Pope (34).​
In the final version of the Thesis, published in n. 1 of the Cahiers de Cassiciacum (May 1979), a “Notice” was added as an introduction (dated 11 February 1979) in which another argument is developed which is based on the contradictory opposition between the magisterium of the Church on religious freedom (for example, but not only, in the encyclical Quanta Cura of Pope Pius IX) and that of the Conciliar Declaration Dignitatis humanæ personæ “promulgated” on December 7, 1965. This declaration should have been guaranteed, if not by the infallibility of the solemn magisterium of the Church to which a Council normally belongs, at least by the infallibility of the universal ordinary magisterium (35). It concludes that, at least beginning on December 7, 1965, Paul VI (no longer) enjoyed Authority, and was (no longer) Pope formaliter. This reasoning, which could be applied to numerous other Conciliar documents, is then completed by those reasonings which are based on the secondary object of the infallibility of the Church, which, as is well known, extends to the promulgation of universal laws, whether canonical or liturgical (36), as well as to the canonization of Saints.​
Father Guérard des Lauriers points out the connection between the various arguments in an interview published in n. 13 of Sodalitium (37), when he explains that there are needs that precede the Communication of “being with”, and others that, instead, follow it. The former are those of the natural order, but belong to the sphere of ontology (that is, of being): to receive the Communication of “being with” from Christ presupposes, as we have seen, the habitual and true intention to procure the good and the ends of the Church (an inductive argument); the latter are those that follow the Communication of “being with”, and are of a supernatural order, of which the principal one is infallibility, both in the solemn magisterium and in the ordinary universal magisterium: this is what the deductive argument is about.

Conclusion
​
At the end of this commentary of ours (I hope not too inaccurate), we can recall some consequences of our thesis (or better: the thesis that we make our own).​
And first of all, that the Church (the one Church founded by Christ; Catholic, Apostolic, Roman) currently finds itself in a “state of
privation” of Authority (38). The Apostolic See is however occupied by the elect of the Conclave – until a declaration to the contrary by the Authority of the Church – who is not an antipope (there not being, on the other hand, a legitimate Pope to oppose him). The said occupant finds himself in a state of “capital schism”, a type of “schism” (not in the canonical sense of the term) proper to one who should be the visible “head” of the Church (without being so, due to the absence of the objective intention to govern the Church to its end) and in which those who declare themselves in “obedience” to him (“una cum”) participate.​
In these circumstances, it is the duty of Catholics not to recognize an Authority who is in no way the Authority, which, among other things, implies that priests not celebrate “una cum”, that the faithful not assist at Mass celebrated one with (“una cum”) the current occupant of the Apostolic See.​
For the continuity of the missio, the mission entrusted by the Father to Christ, and by Christ to the Church, (As the Father has sent me, so I send you: go, teach, baptize…) and particularly for the maintenance of the Sacrifice of the New Testament, the pure Oblation, and therefore the Priesthood, and for the administration of the Sacraments, the sources of grace, it is lawful (only in cases of grave necessity) to confer and receive episcopal consecration, naturally under the conditions required by the Church (to the extent possible) and only if the formal vacancy of the Apostolic See is recognized. For the re-establishment of the Sessio (Sedebitis super sedes… Mt 19, 28) it is necessary to pray, bear witness to the Truth and work so that those who occupy the Episcopal Sees or the Apostolic See itself condemn heresy and publicly profess the Catholic Faith, removing the obstacles preventing them from acting legitimately ‘una cum Christo’ for the good of the Church: the gates of Hell, in fact, will not prevail. May the Lord, the Head of the Church, come soon to her aid, through the mediation of Mary, His Immaculate Mother.

APPENDIX: THE TEXT OF ST. ANTONINUS

Eximii Doctoris BEATI ANTONINI ARCHIEPISCOPI FLORENTINI, ORDINIS PRÆDICATORUM, SUMMÆ SACRÆ THEOLOGIÆ, JURIS PONTIFICII, ET CÆSAREI, TERTIA PARS.
VENETIIS, APUD JUNTAS MDLXXXI.
TITULUS VIGESIMUS PRIMUS

§. 3. Utrum mortuo papa potestas ejus remaneat in collegio cardinalium? Respondet August. in di. 51. q. 3. Duobus modis potestas papæ remanet in collegio cardinalium ipso defuncto. Primo quantum ad ra dicem; comparatur enim collegium ad papam, sicut radix ad arborem vel ramum. Sicut autem potestas arboris vel rami qua floret et fructum producit remanet in radice, ipsa arbore vel ramo destructo, sic potestas papalis remanet in ecclesia, vel collegio ipso papa mortuo. In collegio qui dem tanquam in radice propinqua et in ec clesia prælatorum et aliorum fidelium tanquam in radice remota. Secundo talis potestas remanet in ecclesia et in collegio quantum ad illud, quod est in papatu materiale, quia papa mortuo potest collegium per electionem personam determinare ad papatum, ut sit talis vel talis. Unde sicut radix producit arborem mediante qua flores et fructum producit, sic collegium facit papam habentem jurisdictionem et administrationem ejus in ecclesia. Unde si nomine papatus intelligimus personæ electionem et determinationem, quod est quid materiale in papatu (ut dictum est) sic talis potestas remanet in collegio mortuo papa. Si vero nomine potestatis papalis intelligimus ejus auctoritatem et jurisdictionem, quod est quid formale, sic talis potestas nunquam moritur, quia semper remanet in Christo, qui resurgens a mortuis jam non moritur. Unde super illo verbo, data est mihi omnis potestas in cœlo et in terra, et ecce ego vobiscum sum omnibus diebus usque ad consummationem seculi, Matthæi capite finali dicit Augustinus quod apostoli quibus Christus loquebatur non permansuri erant usque ad consummationem seculi, sed in persona omnium sequentium eos ipsis locutus est tanquam uni corpori ecclesiæ. Sed si nomine potestatis papalis intelligimus actualem administrationem, quod est quid materiale et formale in papatu, sic actualis administratio bene moritur mortuo papa, quia nec remanet in collegio actualis administratio potestatis papalis ipso mortuo, nisi inquantum per statutum prædecesso ris est eis commissum, nec remanet isto modo in Christo, quia de communi lege Christus post resurrectionem non est executus talem potestatem, nisi mediante papa; licet enim ipse sit ostium, Petrum tamen et successores suos constituit ostiarios suos, quibus mediantibus aperitur et clauditur janua intrandi ad ipsum.
Potestas ergo ecclesiæ non moritur mortuo papa quantum ad jurisdictionem, quod et quasi formale in papatu, sed remanet in Christo; nec moritur quantum ad personæ electionem et determinationem, quod est tanquam quid materiale, sed remanet in collegio cardinalium, sed moritur quntum ad actualem administrationem jurisdictionem ejus, quia mortuo papa ecclesia vacat, et privatur administratione talis potestatis. Nec obstat si dicatur Christi sacerdotium durare in æternum sicut Christus, ergo mortuo papa remanet potestas ejus, quia hoc est verum quantum ad id quod est formale in sacerdotio, sicut enim omnes sacerdotes non sunt nisi unus sacerdos, puta Christus quantum ad potestatem conficiendi, quia omnes conficiunt in persona Christi, sic omnes papæ non sunt nisi unus papa, puta Christus, quia omnes papæ recipiunt jurisdictionem et potestatem administrandi immediate a Deo, moritur tamen actualis administratio dictæ potestatis mortuo isto vel illo papa.

Footnotes

1) Our magazine has taken up the election of the Pope many times: for example in n. 55 December 2002) with an article precisely entitled L’elezione del Papa [The Election of the Pope]; then in n. 63 (April 2009), when we asked ourselves Una valida consacrazione episcopale è necessaria per essere Papa? [Is a valid episcopal consecration necessary to become Pope?]; and in n. 56 (September 2003), responding to Tradizione Cattolica on the theme of sedevacantism.
2) “Se fosse stato Papa”[“If he had been the Pope”], Benedict XVI, with his resignation, would have ceased to be so. But since Benedict XVI was not – formally – the Pope, but only materially so, on February 28 2013 he did not cease to be the Pope (since he never was) but only to canonically be elected by the conclave, and occupier of the Apostolic See, which from that moment became absolutely vacant.
3) Eximii Doctoris Beati Antonini Archiepiscopi Florentini, Ordinis Prædicatorum, Summæ Sacræ Theologiæ, juris pontificii et cæsarei (tertia pars, titulus XXI, § 3).
4) This is Patricio Shaw, whom we thank.
5) Tommaso de Vio, called Cajetan (1468-1533),Dominican, general of the Order (1508), Cardinal (1517), wrote in 1511 his De auctoritate Papæ et Concilii (last edition in 1936, at the Angelicum in Rome). An extensive quotation from chapter XX in the De papatu materiali by Dr Donald J. Sanborn, published by our Centro Librario. John of Saint Thomas (1589-1644), Portuguese Dominican, deals with the question in his Cursus Theologicus; Tractatus de auctoritate Summi Pontificis, disp. II.
6) “You are the Christ, you are the Son of the living God” (Mt. 16, 16). Saint Peter, divinely assisted, confessed, on behalf of the whole Church, Faith in the Messiah (You are the Christ) and the divinity of Jesus (You are the Son of the living God). Note how Caiphas, head of the Sanhedrin, will condemn Our Lord to death as a blasphemer for precisely the same reasons: “I adjure you by the living God, tell us if you are the Christ, the Son of God” (Mt. 26, 63). The Sanhedrin of the Jews therefore was is opposition to the Church, just as Peter was is opposition to Caiaphas, and as God the Father, who reveals to Peter the divinity of Jesus, is in opposition to the Father of Lies, for whom Caiaphas the Jews side (see Jn. 18,14).
7) See AGOSTINO PARAVICINI BAGLIANI, Morte ed elezione del Papa. Norme, riti e conflitti. Il Medioevo. Viella publisher, 2013, pp. 19 ss.
8) In the article in question – to which I refer – I recalled both the canonical provisions in force, and what is foreseen in extraordinary cases by theologians. In particular, I recalled how the Pope cannot be elected by the laity (pp. 21-23), nor even by Bishops without jurisdiction (pp. 20-21). As is well known, at least since 1179, only the cardinals have been the electors of the Pope. “In this way – I wrote – the most ancient ecclesiastical tradition is basically maintained; which calls for a Bishop to be elected by his clergy and the surrounding Bishops. The Cardinals are in fact the main members of the Roman Clergy (deacons and priests), united with the Bishops of the neighboring dioceses, called suburbicarian (also Cardinals)” (p. 23). Only in extraordinary cases (if, for example, there were no Cardinals) would the college of electors be sought in the universal Church itself, or in the General Council (imperfect, because it lacks a Pope) (p. 19) which includes the Ordinaries and not the titular bishops, or in any case those without jurisdiction (can. 223 of the Pius-Benedictine code) (p. 20).
9) This, at least, in the case in which the election was canonically valid. What are we to think of a canonically invalid or doubtful election (as could be due to a defect in the electors, a defect in the one elected, or a defect in the election)? In this case the person invalidly or doubtfully designated could not validly accept the election, if in the meantime the defect in the election itself had not been remedied; until, however, the invalid or doubtful election is declared as such by the one who has the right and duty to do so (that is, by the Church, and in particular, by the electoral college itself), the person so designated remains in a certain sense such, and therefore can still be considered the material occupant of the See.
10) De comparatione…, c. XX, cit. in SANBORN, De papatu materiali, Centro Librario Sodalitium, Verrua Savoia, 2002, pp. 98-101.
11) Ibidem, p. 101. It is evident to all, at least after the notorious renunciation of Celestine V, that the Pope can, with an act of will, renounce the papacy. Much more discussed is the point of the intervention of the electors, in the case of the heresy of the Pope as a private doctor, no longer to unite the papacy to such a person, but to separate the papacy from such a person. For Cajetan such intervention is possible and necessary (Papa hæreticus deponendus est: the heretical Pope must be deposed); for Bellarmine this is not possible, nor necessary, since Papa hæreticus depositus est: the heretical Pope is deposed by the very fact, by God. This does not exclude any intervention by the electoral body or the teaching Church, since it is up to it (Her) to ascertain both the heresy and the deposition.
12) To be even more precise, allow me to make a final clarification. In the current case the elect of the Conclave has outwardly accepted, but not really. The case is therefore situated as “halfway” between that of someone who accepts (really) and that of someone who has not yet accepted. Someone who accepts while placing an obstacle that conditions such an acceptance is, as we will see, pope materialiter, but his situation is partly different from that of someone who has not yet accepted.
13) M.-L. GUÉRARD DES LAURIERS o.p., Le Siège Apostolique est-il vacant? (Lex orandi, Lex credendi) in Cahiers de Cassiciacum, n. 1, May 1979. The first unedited version of the text was dated March 26, 1978.
14) This is a primordial definition, compared to the Bellarmine one taken from the catechism: “The Church militant cannot be adequately defined as the group of the faithful subjected to the Pope. It is, primordially, the Mystical Body of Christ; it is composed of the members of Christ who are still pilgrims on this earth. Being subjected to the Pope is normally a necessary condition, on this earth, for being a member of Christ. But being a member of Christ is not CONSTITUTED by what is merely its condition. Being a member of Christ means receiving the communication of Life that proceeds from Christ” (Fr. GUÉRARD DES LAURIERS, op. cit., p. 58).
15) I found a partly similar perspective – only with regard to this aspect, of course – in an article by Monsignor Antonio Livi regarding the controversy between Palmaro and Cascioli over the current occupant of the Apostolic See: “It must be remembered, first of all, that for all of us Catholics, the main (and sometimes only) reason why we should be interested in the words and gestures of the Pope is because he is the head of the Church of Christ by the express will of Christ himself, as we know by faith. It is therefore the convinced adherence to the dogma of the Mystical Body that justifies unconditional obedience to the pastoral directives of the Pope and motivates affective and effective union with him, that devotion that made Saint Catherine of Siena say, in the fourteenth century, that the Pope is ‘the sweet Christ on earth’ (which did not prevent her from going to Avignon to reproach him for not residing in Rome). (…) What the Pope does and says in the exercise of the Petrine ministry must interest all the faithful (…) always and only for the sake of faith: because Christ himself wanted him as Pastor of the universal Church, that is, because in an eminent way he is truly the ‘Vicar of Christ’. This means that the Pope, whoever he may be at a given moment in history – is not so much of interest as a human personality or as a ‘private doctor’, that is, as a simple theologian, but rather as the supreme guarantor of the divine truth entrusted to the Church by the only Teacher, who is Christ. In short (…), the Pope is of relative interest, that is, of interest only in relation to Christ, from whom he receives the authority to ‘feed his sheep’ in his Name; only in relation to Christ, whose Word he must guard, interpret and announce to the world, ‘without adding or taking away anything’; only in relation to Christ, of whom the first Pope, Saint Peter, said that ‘there has been no other name given to us under Heaven by which we can be saved’; (…)” A. LIVI, Obbedienza al Papa, solo in relazione a Cristo [Obedience to the Pope, only in relation to Christ], in La nuova bussola quotidiana, January 18, 2014. What interested me was recalling that Authority in the Church is a relationship with Christ as the Head of the Church.
16) This communication – from Christ to the Authority – is, on the Authority’s side, a “relation” to Christ. About the distinction of grace (gratis data or gratum faciens, both actual and habitual) the “being with” “is of the charism type” (gratia gratis data) “and not of the ‘actual grace’ type” (C.d.C., pp. 48-49).
17) The objective intention of procuring the good/end of the Church must be habitual, just as on the part of Christ, the ‘being with’ the Authority is habitual. When the Authority governs and teaches in action, and in particular when it exercises its infallible magisterium, the ‘being with’ is not only habitual, but actual.​
18) Only in the Church. In fact, other human societies, even perfect ones, such as the State, are essentially natural, and not supernatural like the Church, and within them the Authority does not enjoy the “being with” on the part of Christ! We have already noted in Sodalitium (n. 62 p. 24-31) the grave error which can arise from the confusion between authority in the Church and authority in the State, when between the two societies there is only analogy, and not univocity, quoting precisely from the Cahiers de Cassiciacum, n. 1, pp. 90-99. This error is favored by a basic naturalism typical of certain non-Thomistic theological currents.​
19) As regards offices and faculties during the Sede Vacante (those offices which cease and those that do not, which acts can be exercised and which cannot) see the Apostolic Constitution Vacantis Apostolicæ Sedis of Pius XII (December 8, 1945) published among the documents of the code of canon law: Titulus I. De Sede Apostolica vacante Capitolo I: De potestate S. Collegii Cardinalium Sede Apostolica vacante; Chapter III: De nonnullis peculiaribus officiis, Sede Apostolica vacante; Chapter IV: De Sacris Romanis Congregationibus et Tribunalibus eorumque facultatitibus Sede Apostolica vacante.​
20) A Council convened during the Sede Vacante is not an ecumenical council, but is defined as an “imperfect general council”.
21) On the indefectibility of the Church, see what has already been written in Sodalitium, n. 56, pp. 20-21.
22) DON PIERO CANTONI, Réflexions à propos d’une thèse récente sur la situation actuelle de l’Église [Reflections on a Recent Thesis concerning the Current Situation of the Church], Ecône, May-June 1988; DON CURZIO NITOGLIA, La Tesi di Cassicìacum: il Papato materiale. Per un dibattito sereno [The Cassicìacum Thesis: the Material Papacy. For a Tranquil Debate], published on the author’s website and the publisher Effedieffe. See also note 33 of this article.
23) Father Guérard offers various examples: the doctrine on collegiality of Lumen Gentium which was ‘corrected’ by the so-called ‘nota prævia’ (reassuring words which remained a dead letter); the Novus Ordo Missæ corrected by the reassuring speeches of November 19 and 26, 1969 which have remained a dead letter; the words on the maintenance of Latin in the liturgy, denied by the facts; the words of Humanæ vitæ, whilst in fact Paul VI gave free rein to the denial of the encyclical by the episcopal conferences. Today, the situation, in words and in facts, is far more serious and clearer than it was then!
24) In note 36, Father Guérard specifies that, in order to be members of the Church, the Communication in question is normally that of divine Life, sanctifying grace, but which can temporarily be reduced to the Communication of Faith: “Whoever has Faith, even dead, remains a member of the Church”. The analogy is taken up again, deepened and applied to the current situation of the Church on pages 50-51 and 56, which are also a wonderful summary of the treatise on grace. Father Guérard also explains – more deeply than I myself did in answering Father Paladino (F. RICOSSA, Don Paladino and the “Cassiciacum Thesis”. Response to the book: “Petrus es tu?” pp 9-10 and footnote 19) – the relationship between divine Communication and human assent, both in the infusion of Grace (justification) and, analogically, in the Communication of Authority in the Church.
25) B. LUCIEN, La situation actuelle de l’Autorité dans l’Église. La Thèse de Cassiciacum. [The current situation of Authority in the Church. The Thesis of Cassiciacum.] Documents de Catholicité 1985, p. 61, note 69. H. BELMONT, L’exercice quotidien de la Foi dans la crise de l’Église [The daily exercise of the Faith within the crisis of the Church], published by the author, Bordeaux 1984, p. 25.
26) This is a particularly important point. The main application, in my opinion, is found in the possibility that the ‘cardinals’ created by the ‘papa materialiter’ still retain it today so as to elect the Pope.
27) Address to the Second World Congress of the Lay Apostolate, October 5, 1957. The credit for having found this example goes again to Father Lucien, op. cit., p. 59, note 65.
28) ARNALDO XAVIER VIDIGAL DA SILVEIRA, La nouvelle messe de Paul VI: qu’en penser? [The New Mass of Paul VI: what to think of it?] Diffusion de la Pensée Française, 1975, pp. 215-216, where the author hopes for new studies on the question of the “heretical Pope” that will lead to an end to the stagnation and doubts regarding the various hypotheses on the subject. After the publication of the Thesis of Father Guérard des Lauriers in the Cahiers de Cassiciacum, Father Georges Vinson, in his Simple Lettre wrote that the works of Father Guérard had realized and fulfilled the desires and wishes expressed by Vidigal da Silveira.
29) See Cahiers de Cassiciacum, n. 1, pp. 30-31, 76-77. Voluntarism, historicism and juridicism are three erroneous intellectual options connected to each other that have caused profound damage in philosophy and theology, and which are still today an obstacle, even for many otherwise well-intentioned minds, to understanding what the current situation of Authority in the Church really is.
30) B. LUCIEN, op. cit. Chapters VI and VII (pp. 63-92) are devoted to the subject of the “heretical pope”; chapter VIII (pp. 85-92) to the canonical argument; chapter IX (pp. 93-96) to the Bull of Paul IV. The volume, written under the supervision of Bishop Guérard des Lauriers, has not yet been translated into Italian.
31) See also C.d.C., n. 1, pp. 78 ff.
32) C.d.C., n. 1, p. 52, where, among other things, the controversial case of Pope Honorius is examined, about which Father Guérard concludes: “The inadvertence, and even the flippancy of Honorius I, if it was truly such, was only occasional; it did not exclude the habitual intention of serving the Good-End entrusted to the Church. This lack, if there was one, did not deprive Honorius I of the Communication of ‘being with’ which, proceeding from Christ, constituted him Pope formaliter throughout his Pontificate. Instead the deficient behaviors of Paul VI are multiple and convergent. It is only this accumulation that permits, and unfortunately demands, the conclusion that the current occupant of the Apostolic See does not have the habitual intention of realizing the Good-End entrusted to the Church. Hence it follows that, unlike Honorius, he is not Pope formaliter” (C.d.C., n. 1, p. 53, note 43). Note how the proof of the Thesis maintains all its validity regardless of many arguments discussed in recent years, such as the theological hypothesis of the heretical Pope (the example of Honorius has been invoked, Father Guérard points out, both by the defenders and the accusers of Paul VI), or even the possibility or otherwise of errors not only in the ecclesiastical government but also in the texts of the magisterium of the Pope. That some pontiffs have governed the Church better than others, or differently from their predecessors, no one doubts or disputes; only, sometimes, historians judge the pontificate of one pontiff or another differently, they certainly being less infallible than the Pope! There has been much discussion regarding the possibility of errors in the authentic (official) magisterium of the Church (and therefore of its Head), as well as in ecclesiastical laws and discipline (liturgy, canon law, canonizations, approvals of religious orders), and regarding the extension of infallibility defined by the Vatican Council (DS 3074 as regards the solemn magisterium of the Pope, DS 3011 as regards the solemn or ordinary magisterium of the Church). Of those who defend the possibility of errors in the documents of the papal magisterium and in the liturgical texts of the Church, the undisputed ‘Father’ – sometimes cited, sometimes not, but always plundered first or second hand – is the Brazilian author Arnaldo Xavier Vidigal da Silveira (for example, in his book ‘La messe de Paul VI, qu’en penser?’ and in the article ‘Vi può essere errore nei documenti del Magistero? [‘Can there be errors in the documents of the Magisterium?’] published by Catolicismo n. 223, July 1969, translated by Cristianità, n. 10, p. 11 March-April 1975, and finally most recently published by Radio Spada). Father Nitoglia, thus returning to the origins, and the historian Roberto De Mattei in his ‘Apologia della Tradizione’, a true indictment of almost all the Popes in history, have also recently referred to Vidigal da Silveira. We totally disagree with this ‘fallibilistic’ current (da Silveira cannot cite a single magisterial document to support his thesis); nevertheless we point out that even in this case the Thesis remains demonstratable, since it is based on a habitual, lasting, convergent absence of intention to effectively realize the good and the end of the Church, and not on episodic shortcomings – if there ever were any – which have not compromised the realization of the good and the end of the Church.
33) The reaction of the Society to the publication of the Cahiers de Cassiciacum was, at least in intellectual production, non-existent; in practice, it was a total break with Father Guérard. The only exception was Father Piero Cantoni, then a professor at the seminary of Ecône, whose objection to the Thesis was that if Christ had deprived not only the Pope, but all the bishops in communion with him, of the “being with” Him, the inadmissible hypothesis of a “Vacant Church” would be realized and the divine promise “I will be with you until the end of time” would not be realized. The objection is not a small one, even if it is not unsolvable (see for example Sodalitium n. 56, pp. 20-30 regarding the indefectibility of the Church). In an ad hominem argument, Father Guérard responded among other things (C.d.C. n. 6, May 1981, pp. 111-112, 116-117) that all those who opposed Vatican II and the liturgical reform were forced to admit that the Church today “is always with” Christ, but in a different way than it was before Vatican II. If Father Cantoni wished to be consistent, he had to deny this common position to all opponents of the conciliar doctrine and the new liturgy, and consequently leave the Society of Saint Pius X. Invariably, this is what Father Cantoni did, accepting the Council and the new liturgy in its entirety.
34) See Cahiers de Cassiciacum, n, 1, pp. 51-55.
35) Father Bernard Lucien then explored the various parts of this argument in depth in the following volumes: L’infaillibilité du magistère ordinaire et universel de l’Église [The infallibility of the Ordinary and Universal Magisterium of the Church], Documents de Catholicité, Bruxelles, 1984; and Grégoire XVI, Pie IX et Vatican II. Études sur la liberté religieuse dans la doctrine catholique [Gregory XVI, Pius IX and Vatican II. Studies on Religious Liberty in Catholic Doctrine], Forts dans la Foi, Tours, 1990. After having abandoned the Thesis (correctly expounded by him in La Situation actuelle de l’Autorité dans l’Église. La Thèse de Cassiciacum, 1985) in 1992, Father Lucien wrote further valuable studies on the magisterium, including Les degrés d’autorité du Magistère [The Degrees of Authority of the Magisterium], La Nef, 2007, which are also useful for those who, like us, do not share the decision taken by the author in 1992. Numerous articles on the subject have been published on Sodalitium over the years, especially by Father Giuseppe Murro.
36) This does not mean, obviously, that the discipline or the liturgy of the Church is not reformable, or that every canon or law or liturgical rubric expresses a truth of faith. It does mean, however, that the Church, in her laws as in her worship, cannot approve or even permit anything harmful to faith or to Christian morality and life. If the liturgical reform (of the missal, of the pontifical, as well as the ritual of the sacraments) and the canonical reform came from the Church, and therefore from the Pope, we would be guaranteed of their sanctity and conformity with Christian faith and morality; there would be no reason to abstain from embracing said reforms, simply obeying the Authority. The various arguments, of course, imply and corroborate one another.
37) The interview was republished in the work Il problema dell’Autorità e dell’Episcopato nella Chiesa [The problem of Authority in the Episcopate of the Church], Centro Librario Sodalitium, Verrua Savoia, 2005. The point in question is discussed on page 35.
38) This is the correct expression to describe the current situation of the Church. It seems less correct to explain the current situation with the category “eclipsed Catholic Church” and “Conciliar Church”.